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In its foreign policy, Azerbaijan has succeeded in moving away from 
a unilateral approach and from the psychology of fear that was fed 
by regional conflicts. New perspectives have facilitated the country’s 
transition to a multilateral, active and dynamic foreign policy. Heydar 
Aliyev negotiated Azerbaijan’s foreign policy on a balanced axis 
through the problematic triangle of occupation, regional tension 
and international isolation that he inherited from former President 
Abulfaz Elchibey. Succeeding his father, current President Ilham Aliyev 
took over a foreign policy that maintained equal distance to regional 
powers and positioned the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and 
the Karabakh case at the centre. Based on this structure, Aliyev has 
constructed a multidimensional foreign policy.1
Firstly, Azerbaijan’s priority is to position the country as an important 
actor both regionally and internationally. The Aliyev government has 
recoded its relations in the region and adopted a policy of balance 
in its relations with regional powers that is aimed at pursuing good 
relations with its neighbours. Secondly, the country has improved its 
relations with Western institutions such as the Council of Europe and 
promoted its credibility in the eyes of these international institutions. 
Thirdly, Azerbaijan has diversified its foreign policy and trade relations, 
starting with Asian countries. Finally, the Aliyev government has 
pursued a policy to utilize the leverage of oil and natural gas projects 
and pipeline policies in order to evolve to an influential player in 
regional politics and in energy security in the East-West corridor.2
Throughout these processes, Azerbaijan adopted a new style of 
diplomacy. The government embraced a multidimensional diplomacy 
that centred on the occupied territories and the efficient use of natural 
resources in its policy making. Azerbaijan’s ability to develop short 
and medium-term strategic partnerships and to manoeuvre quickly 
has enabled the country to act as the game-setter in implementing 
preventive diplomacy and the development of energy policies.
Turkey’s policy for the Caucasus should be analysed within the context 
of the regional policy that emerged in the 2000s.3 In line with this new 
foreign policy, the Caucasus is a potential region of influence and 
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If we view the evolution of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations in terms of 
chronology, we can call the current era ‘the energy relations period’. 
This period was preceded by Azerbaijan’s post-independence political 
history, when it strived to strengthen its internal stability and balance 
its relations with Russia, Turkey and the West. Following Ilham Aliyev’s 
election as President for the third time at the end of 2013, it is clear that 
energy is the main driver of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. Turkey, in turn, 
is pursuing a dynamic policy aimed at becoming an energy hub, as 
part of an active and multidimensional foreign policy.
Some commentators noted the fluctuations in Turkish-Azerbaijani 
relations caused by the Turkish-Armenian normalization process 
in 2008, speculating that this blip would permanently damage the 
basis of the bilateral relationship. However, Ankara and Baku have 
weathered the negative impact of the normalization process and 
gained new perspectives in repairing the damage. It would not be 
inaccurate to say that this new perspective was a strategic decision 
taken by the political elite in both countries. After all, the political will to 
build close strategic relations has been clearly demonstrated by both 
governments. It was precisely at that point that energy emerged as a 
factor in laying and indeed embodying the foundation for relations.
The swift developments in the last few years signal that the future of 
the relationship will be based on energy cooperation. This paper will 
discuss energy cooperation in two subsections. First will be the general 
trends in Turkey and Azerbaijan’s respective foreign policies, which 
provided a new era in bilateral relations. Second will be the evolution 
of energy cooperation, with a focus on Turkey’s attempt to become an 
energy hub in the region and Azerbaijan’s placement of energy politics 
as a central element in its foreign policy. The analysis will end with a 
general evaluation and a discussion of the future prospects in energy 
cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Turkish-Azerbaijani relations are currently taking shape based upon 
energy relations. This development is based on the two countries’ 
priorities in foreign policy and regional politics, underpinned by the 
mutual political will to maintain relations at this level. This paper 
analyzes the evolution of energy cooperation, Turkey’s attempt to 
become an energy hub in the region and Azerbaijan’s placement of 
energy politics as a central component in its foreign policy orientation. 
It concludes that Azerbaijan increased it leverage in regional energy 
politics and Turkey took a significant stride forward in terms of shifting 
from a transit country into an energy hub.
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“We, as Turkey, desire the issue to be resolved in a peaceful way. 
We support all efforts in this regard; however, it is concerning 
that the Minsk group has not been able to resolve the issue in 
the past 16 years. The recent conflicts in the region illustrate 
just how fragile the situation in the Southern Caucasus is”.13
Turkey’s involvement in the Karabakh issue and its siding with 
Azerbaijan reflects an obvious policy choice. In this sense, the close 
links between Azerbaijan and Turkey and their cooperation in the field 
of energy have made Azerbaijan the most important regional country 
for Turkey. In the past years, Turkish and Azeri collaborations have been 
developed between NGOs, universities and research institutes.14 It was 
decided during Prime Minister Erdoğan’s trip to Azerbaijan on May 
17th, 2010 that the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council would 
be founded. During these trips, Turkey’s involvement and partnership 
in the Shah Deniz II was mutually agreed upon by both sides. The 
former stage of Shah Deniz I provides natural gas to Turkey and 
Georgia. Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Aliyev co-chaired the 
first HLSCC meeting in Izmir on October 24th, 2011, and subsequent 
meetings were held regularly in the following years. The two sides had 
an extensive agenda for cooperation in economy and politics, and 
accordingly signed agreements ranging from investment promotion 
to police education.15
Relations with Azerbaijan and the Energy Factor
Three projects have shaped the energy dimension of Turkish-
Azerbaijani relations. Two of those projects were implemented and 
are now operational, namely the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Oil Pipeline 
and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) Natural Gas Pipeline (see Figure 1 
in the Annex), also known as the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). The 
BTC Oil Pipeline (active since 2006) and the BTE Natural Gas Pipeline 
constitute the two main pillars of energy relations.16 These pipelines 
are critical in transporting Azerbaijani oil and natural gas to Europe. 
The BTC pipeline is approximately 1800 km long, and the agreement 
was signed after a series of negotiations among the governments of 
Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, Georgia and various private companies. The 
total daily capacity of the BTC is one million barrels, and its annual 
capacity is 50 million tonnes. Natural gas from Azerbaijan has been 
transported alongside the BTE pipeline to Turkey since 2007. The 
decision to do so was made while oil was being extracted for the BTC 
pipeline. Based on the terms of this agreement, which has been in 
force for 15 years, Turkey will receive 6.6 billion cubic meters of natural 
13 “Kafkasya İşbirliğine Aliyev Desteği”, in Radikal, 20 August 2008, http://www.
radikal.com.tr/dunya/kafkasya_isbirligine_aliyev_destegi-894659. See also Azerbaijan 
Presidency, Statements for media representatives by President Ilham Aliyev and Prime 
Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 20 August 2008, http://archive.president.az/
articles.php?item_id=20080903105812573&sec_id=70.
14 Bülent Aras, “Bakü”, cit.
15 “Azerbycan’la Dev İmza”, in Sabah, 25 October 2011, http://www.sabah.com.tr/
Ekonomi/2011/10/25/azerbaycanla-dev-imza.
16 Emre İşeri, “Geopolitics of Oil and Pipelines in the (Eurasian) Heartland”, in Bülent 
Gökay (ed.), The Politics of Oil. A Survey, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 35-45.
opportunity. Turkey’s policy towards the Caucasus aims to develop 
political and economic relations with the countries in the region and 
to help them develop mechanisms of internal stability and prosperity 
as well as build regional peace and security.4 The Turkish International 
Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) plays an active role in 
this.5 A large portion – 47.9 percent – of TİKA’s developmental aid is 
allocated to the Caucasus and the Middle East.6 This aid has been offered 
in the areas of economic and industrial infrastructural development, 
health and education, academic collaboration, internship programs for 
regional students in Turkey, and Turkish language programs as well as 
in efforts to increase business relations. In addition to TİKA, the Turkish 
Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) and the 
Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) are also active in the region.7
Turkey’s increasing international commerce with Eurasian countries is 
a result of its emerging business interests in that region. The volume 
of commerce between Turkey and Azerbaijan was 326 million dollars 
in 2000; by 2013 this had increased to 3.3 billion dollars.8 Additionally, 
Turkey is the first country in Georgia’s imports and fifth in exports.9 For 
Azerbaijan, it is the first in imports and the eleventh in exports.10 The 
fact that the borders are closed between Armenia and Turkey prevents 
direct trade between the two countries. Accordingly, Turkish products 
make their way to Armenia mostly through Iran and Georgia.
Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan are determined by historical, 
cultural, ethnic and religious connections as well as by mutual 
goodwill. Energy cooperation has been a key factor in bilateral 
relations. Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan play an important role in 
determining relations with other countries in the region. For instance, 
its relations with Azerbaijan have a significant impact on its relations 
with Armenia. Without a doubt, the major issue is the unresolved 
Karabakh conflict. In the years following Azerbaijan’s independence, 
the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulted in great losses. 
This included the assault on Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity with the 
loss of the mountainous Karabakh region to Armenia. In addition, 
Armenia also occupies one-fifth of Azerbaijani land and six different 
regions. Around one million Azeris were forced to leave the Karabakh 
region and the six adjacent regions, and are currently classified as 
internally displaced peoples within Azerbaijan. This situation remains 
the same today.11 While Armenia considers its presence in Karabakh 
to be legitimate, Azerbaijan deems the situation an “occupation”. The 
official stance taken by Turkey and the UN supports the Azerbaijani 
view. Turkey insists that the two countries resolve the Karabakh 
issue through diplomatic means, using international channels. The 
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform established by Turkey 
after the Georgia-Russia crisis in 2008 was designed to realize this 
goal. However, the Minsk process initiated and carried out by the US, 
Russia and France, one of the most significant attempts at diplomacy 
so far, has largely failed to make significant progress. Even though the 
parties have come together on various occasions, no progress has 
been made in resolving the dispute.12 As Turkish Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan stated,
4 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”, in Insight 
Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2008), p. 77-96, http://arsiv.setav.org/ups/dosya/9595.pdf.
5 Hakan Fidan and Rahman Nurdun, “Turkey’s Role in the Global Development 
Assistance Community: The Case of TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and 
Development Agency)”, in Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 10, No. 1 
(April 2008), p. 93-111.
6 In 2012 the Middle East received 46.6 percent of the development aid, while 
only 1.3 percent of the aid went to the Caucasus. See TİKA, Turkey’s Development 
Assistance Report 2012, January 2014, http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/publications/turkey-
development-assistance-report/25.
7 See TUSKON website: http://www.tuskon.org.
8 For figures on foreign trade see the following websites: Turkish Statistical Institute 
(TUIK): http://www.tuik.gov.tr.
9 National Statistics Office of Georgia (GeoStat): http://www.geostat.ge/index.
php?action=0&lang=eng.
10 State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan: http://www.stat.gov.az/
source/azfigures/indexen.php.
11 Bülent Aras, “Bakü”, in Sabah, 18 August 2010, http://www.sabah.com.tr/
Gundem/2010/08/18/baku.
12 Ibidem.
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gas from the Shah Deniz I field in Azerbaijan.
The third important project is the Trans Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline 
(TANAP), part of the Southern Gas Corridor. In late October 2011, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan and President Aliyev signed two agreements during 
the HLSC meeting. Under the first agreement, Azerbaijan will sell Shah 
Deniz II gas to Turkey in 2017, and under the second, Azerbaijan will 
transport gas from Shah Deniz II to Turkey between 2017 and 2042.17 
These two agreements finalised the terms of Turkey’s purchase of 
natural gas and opened up new prospects for transportation of gas 
to the European markets. Turkey is likely to obtain re-export rights in 
the transport deal. These projects also helped to strengthen Turkey’s 
projection of itself as a regional hub, as well as justify the feasibility of 
the projected pipelines.18
TANAP, an 1841 km-long pipeline, will carry 16 bcm of Azerbaijani gas 
to Europe via Georgia and Turkey, entering Turkey from the Georgian 
border and exiting from Thrace. Once it has crossed the Turkish border 
to Europe, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), an 870 km-long pipeline, 
will carry the Azerbaijani gas to Italy (see Figure 2 in the Annex). Turkey 
will buy 6 bcm and the rest will be carried to Europe through TAP. There 
are studies on the possibility of increasing the capacity to 31 bcm.19 
Azerbaijan resolved the longstanding East-West pipeline negotiations 
in its favour so that it delivers gas to Europe through TANAP, a pipeline 
it will have in partnership with Turkey and BP, and through the TAP link. 
These parties will take on the reconstruction and operation of TANAP 
together, but may also consider including other partners.
This project of carrying Shah Deniz II gas to Europe put an end to 
the former mega pipeline project of Nabucco, which was a mainly 
European project designed for the same purpose. However, market 
conditions and the lack of vision for energy security in Europe made 
this project obsolete. Azerbaijan’s strategic calculation was the building 
of a direct pipeline to have direct access to European markets. Turkey’s 
cooperation made this project feasible and possible and energized 
again the idea of the Southern Gas Corridor.
Through the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), Turkey partners 
in the Shah Deniz II field that will provide the Southern Gas Corridor 
with gas. It is a major advantage for Turkey to be both the provider 
of and the transit country for gas. Turkey’s plan to become an energy 
hub is one of the main goals of its new foreign policy. As a country 
surrounded by rich energy resources to its east and high-consuming 
countries to its west, it seems feasible for Turkey to be a transit country 
for energy. It is an approach that bolsters Turkey’s geopolitical vision of 
itself as a central country. The benefits that Turkey will gain from the 
energy transit lines, along with a strong political position, will reinforce 
its position as a central country.
The BTC and BTE pipelines and the Blue Stream pipeline that is coming 
from Russia are important developments in Turkey’s policy towards 
becoming a transit country and energy hub. In addition to that, there 
are smaller-scale pipelines. However, the latter are projects for Turkey’s 
consumption.
Through TANAP, a new phase has been opened. Turkey has also 
become a strategic partner of the Southern Gas Corridor. This pipeline, 
which will cross Georgia and a group of Balkan countries in the West, 
is also a stability project. The total cost of TANAP is anticipated to be 
around 12 billion dollars. It will provide Turkey with a contribution of 
17 For a well-articulated analysis and information, see Emin Emrah Danış, “Şah Deniz, 
Türkiye’ye ve Bölgeye Kazandırmaya Devam Ediyor = Shah Deniz Keeps Contributing 
to the Development of Turkey and the Region”, in Hazar World, No. 16 (March 2014), 
p. 38-48, http://www.hazar.org/UserFiles/yayinlar/HazarWorld/hazar_baski_son_016_
low.pdf.
18 Şaban Kardaş, “Turkey Clears the Way For Azerbaijani Gas Transfers”, in Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 201 (1 November 2011), http://www.jamestown.org/
programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38604.
19 See Efgan Nifti and Fatih Macit, “Energy Future of Europe and the Role of the 
Southern Corridor”, in Caspian Report, Vol. 2, No. 5 (Fall 2013), p. 7-15, http://hazar.org/
Content.aspx?item=471.
around 5 billion dollars in investment and construction, while at the 
same time creating employment opportunities and economic value 
along its route. Turkey will have control of 30 percent of the shares 
in TANAP, while Azerbaijan will have 58 percent and BP 12 percent. 
Turkey’s transition into being an energy provider through Shah Deniz 
II is the most critical development in its path to becoming an energy 
hub. Turkey will have an influential position in the upstream and 
midstream of the Southern Gas Corridor in this process (see figure 3 
in the Annex).
This energy-oriented momentum in bilateral relations is positively 
reflected in trade and investment relations. Azerbaijan is a priority 
destination for Turkey’s foreign direct investment. Azerbaijan bought 
the majority stake of Turkey’s giant petrochemicals company as a 
sign of Azerbaijan’s desire to reciprocate with the oil and gas riches 
it acquired in the recent era. The volume of foreign trade between 
Turkey and Azerbaijan reached 3.3 billion dollars in 2013. During the 
HLSCC meetings, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic 
(SOCAR) committed to building a refinery in Izmir, which entails a 5 
billion dollars investment, scheduled for 2015. SOCAR bought 51 
percent share of PETKIM, giant petrochemical complex of Turkey, 
during privatization tender in 2008 and developing PETKIM port as 
the biggest integrated port of Turkey.20 Besides these projects, SOCAR 
also aims to make other investments in Turkey that will reach 21 billion 
dollars by 2023.
Conclusion
Turkish-Azerbaijani relations are currently taking shape based upon 
energy relations. This development is based on the two countries’ 
priorities in foreign policy and regional politics, underpinned by the 
mutual political will to maintain relations at this level. Ilham Aliyev’s 
objective for Azerbaijan in his third presidential term is to reinforce 
the active, game-setting policy. Economic growth is based on the 
country’s major role in regional energy projects and energy-based 
investments outside the country. Azerbaijan builds its policies based 
on transporting its underground resources to the market through 
good management, strengthening its regional role and realizing the 
country’s structural transformation. It is believed that the steps taken 
towards these objectives will increase the country’s power and help 
it reclaim the land occupied by Armenia. Azerbaijan uses the energy 
projects as both a carrot and stick against Armenia. These projects, 
which benefit regional actors to varying degrees, isolate Armenia. On 
the other hand, SOCAR has emphasized many times that Armenia 
could also participate in these projects if peace can be reached.
It is of great importance for Turkey that Azerbaijan prefers to 
collaborate with Turkey. In becoming a part of the Southern Gas 
Corridor, Turkey took a significant stride forward in terms of shifting 
from a transit country into an energy hub. It is possible to say that it will 
try to gain more leverage by gaining more authority over the transit 
resources. The efforts to establish an energy stock market in Turkey are 
a result of its dedication to this aim. The ultimate aim is to become 
an energy hub that might go as far as pricing, which means going 
beyond upstream and midstream and becoming influential in the 
downstream. Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan show that it will not 
take unilateral steps toward normalization with Armenia in the near 
future. Positive developments in its relations with Armenia will only 
be possible through reconciliation between Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
Both Turkey and Azerbaijan advocate for integration with the West. 
We see in Aliyev’s third term signals that Azerbaijan’s foreign policy 
will move closer to the West. In this regard, the BTC, BTE and SCG are 
instruments to integrate Azerbaijan into the Western energy security 
structure. However, it is a given that both countries will avoid disrupting 
relations with Russia, which could give rise to negative consequences. 
The Nabucco project was perceived as a rival pipeline in Russia mainly 
20 For detailed information on the projects, see the website of SOCAR Turkey at 
http://www.socar.com.tr.
POLICY BRIEF  15 5April 2014
due to heavy European involvement. Although TANAP+TAP projection 
means diversification of gas supply, a 10 billion bcm supply to Europe 
is not a challenge to Russia considering European gas demand and 
Russian supply capacity.21 Russian rival project South Stream does not 
seem feasible and is a far possibility at this time. Azerbaijan provides 
1 billion bcm natural gas to Russia with a symbolic agreement. 
Thus Azerbaijan will stick with its balance policy and refrain from 
challenging Russia unnecessarily. As far as Turkey is concerned, Russia 
is an important trade partner and a country with which it wants to 
avoid political tensions. A controlled policy toward Russia that ensures 
21 Efgan Nifti and Fatih Macit, “Energy Future of Europe and the Role of the Southern 
Corridor”, cit., p. 7.
the preservation of the critical balance is the common goal of Turkey 
and Azerbaijan.
This is a new period in which Turkish-Azerbaijani relations are energy-
oriented and have a stronger foundation than in previous periods. 
The future of this relationship depends mainly on maintaining the 
current level of political will. Yet it is possible to say that relations will be 
guaranteed as long as the momentum of the Southern Gas Corridor 
and bilateral trade, especially Azerbaijan’s investments in Turkey, is 
sustained.
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Figure 1. The BTC and SCP Pipelines
Source: Embassy of Azerbaijan in Turkey, South Caucasus Pipeline, http://www.azembassy.org.tr/index.php?options=content&id=81.
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Figure 2. TANAP and TAP
Source: “Pre-qualification tender for TANAP announced”, in Hürriyet Daily News, 7 August 2013, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nID=52126.
Figure 3. Shah Deniz and the Southern Gas Corridor
Source: Efgan Nifti and Fatih Macit, “Energy Future of Europe and the Role of the Southern Corridor”, cit., p. 11. 
Courtesy of Hazar Strategy Institute.
